Interview to Octavi Fullat. Education as Anthropogenesis

By Sandra Lilia Galvez de Rudzki

This interview was originally made in June of 2002 when I was working in the realization of my dissertation La educación como antropogénesis. El tiempo como categoría pedagógica en el pensamiento de Octavi Fullat. Education as anthropogenesis is a concept that has been presented by Octavi Fullat through his extensive work. Octavi explains education as anthropogenesis through the intertwining of the categories: man, time, education and death. Octavi clarifies that to become human can only be possible through education. The education is a result of biology and sociology, but he explains that the pure education as a social process -which leads us to the identity with others- is not enough to explain the human being. He also writes that the human is constitute by temporality which introduce us in a tension between what we are and we want to be, between the meaning of the life experience and the sense of what is to come, between ideology and utopianism. The education as anthropogenesis is a journey that takes us through the interpretation of our lives. It departs from the interpretation of our actions and arrives in the reflection of our life –it is a process that goes from I am to I think.

This interview pretends to give support to the concept of Education as antropogénesis in voice of Octavi Fullat. The development of the interview also shows important events in the life of Octavi Fullat. The events are included because Octavi Fullat despite being defined as a philosopher of Education is also a pedagogue that tries to apply his own concepts to his life. That is to say, the extensive and important work of Octavi Fullat has focused on education from three main lines: epistemological, anthropological and axiological, but the major interest of his work lies in its educational praxis that is derived from the interesting entanglement between reflexivity and
historicity -where thought and actions are joined to leave him in the dissatisfaction that makes him an “eternal walker”-. Thought and action objectify in Octavi Fullat the paradigm of an education that goes beyond the simple change of behavior. Fullat has been characterized as critical, as someone who escapes from the dogmatic knowledge and the dictatorship. As you will confirm later in the interview, Fullat opposes to the social subjugation. He is in favor of the individual. He defends that the man deserves to be treated as an aim in itself, not as a mediation that is manipulated with emotions or through persuasion. Fullat shows in practice that without affection the educational action dies.

What does his academic experience tell us about Octavi Fullat? Octavi Fullat has been a professor since 1950. He has taught in prominent universities in Catalunya, Spain and France. He has also been teaching courses, conferences, and participated in congresses in several universities of Mexico, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and Italy. He has published more than 125 books, and numerous articles at prestigious magazines. Some of his books have been translated into German, French, and Portuguese. During 1970-1971 he studied in Paris with Lévi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, Jean Wahl and Aubenque, at the Collège de France and the Sorbonne. He has also worked with prominent philosophers as: Ayer, Bochenski, von Braun, Congar, Derrida, D’Hondt, Dubarle, Flores d’Arcais, Freire, Gadamer, Hyppolite, Leakey, Lefebvre, Levinas, Löwith, Marion, Martinet, Nemo, Perelman, Prigogine, Reboul, Paul Ricoeur, Rostand, Schaff, Strasser, Vuillemin, and Wahl. His work has received numerous awards. He was the president of the Consell Escolar de Catalunya (1989-1993), and of Consell Superior d’Avaluació del Sistema Educatiu de Catalunya (1994-1999). He was distinguished with a title as Doctor Honoris Causa by the universities of Valle de México (1992), from Mexico, and the University of Educares (1998), of Santiago de Chile. He was an assessor for the educative research for the Portuguese government between 1998 and 2001; and an assessor for the evaluation of universities from 2002-2003. Nowadays, he is a member of the Comité d’Honneur de la Société francophone de philosophie de l’éducation (SOFPHIED) together with Guy Avanzini, Daniel Hameline, Hubert Hannoun and Georges Snyders.
Fullat is a philosopher, but he is also a pedagogue. His praxis matches with the definition of a philosopher of education offered by Brauner and Beck in *Philosophy of Education Essays and Commentaries*. They explained that being a philosopher means, besides being a professor in a department of philosophy and carry out the activities of this department which must commit itself to philosophical activity, to exercise the functions of a philosopher and think and act philosophically. They point out that to make this the philosopher must:

“think reflectively, think freely, doubt, inquire, cultivate hypotheses, infer consequences, think what the known demands, analyze, synthesize, and project ideas. Secondly, to be a philosopher does not mean that such thinking need be done apart from education, nor that it be restricted to education. The philosopher does not just think, he must think about something. What he thinks about are problems of men, what the known objects and events of life demand, what seems possible; in short, human experience and nature. Education, then, if it be life, or related to life, must be a concern of the philosopher. The philosopher can not effectively deal with education alone, however, for he cannot treat education separately from the rest of experience. In short, he cannot explain education merely in terms of education”.

I invite you now to accompany me in this interview.

June 2002

**Doctor Octavi Fullat:**

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I have had the opportunity of assisting to many of yours courses, in the European continent and in Latin-America. I had read most of your books, and I had the privilege to be directed by you in my research “Planteamiento de la axiología educativa en el pensamiento de Octavi Fullat. Una interpretación de Viaje Inacabado. La axiología educativa en la Postmodernidad”\(^3\). We have had the opportunity of meeting many times in order to brighten important topics that had helped me to understand better your thought. Now, I can see through you work that actions and your life had characterized you as an “unsatisfied” person, someone who is always questioning your own self, and as a consequence you have been an individual in permanent change. I would like to thank you for your entire disposition in helping me to brighten up important concepts that you had developed in your thought, concepts that have been of grand importance in the educative field. And I would like to proceed with this interview.

1. You are an Educative Philosopher, but you also develop pedagogical activities. How do you prefer to be defined: as a philosopher or pedagogue?

First, I think that the wisest thing to do is to start with the linguistic codification. Philosopher is the person that produces philosophical discourses. But, what is philosophy? If we appeal to the historical succession of Occident -the only one that I know with certain security- we have to recognize that the significant *philosophy* has been used in mainly two semantics directions: philosophy as meta-language and philosophy as metaphysics –which is the discourse that goes beyond of all possible experience-. My writing production correspond to the second meaning of philosophy; epistemology, philosophical anthropology and axiology – which are tangible notions of my duty of thinking--; they are insert in the philosophy interpreted as a metaphysics.

Now, parallel to my occupation as a philosopher I have another uninterrupted activity since 1950. I am talking about my occupation as an educator, which I have been inside and outside of the academy. Is this practice education or pedagogy? I define as educator the persons who educates through theories that are in the market of knowledge. Pedagoge, in the other side, is a person who has personal conceptions in the educative

\(^3\) Approachment to the Educative Axiology in the though of Octavi Fullat. (Barcelona, Spain; 1996)
field –more or less personal– and that uses his/her ideas in the practical ambit of education.

Now that I have made these semantics precisions I have to confess that I am a pedagogue. My pedagogical conception belongs to the sphere of philosophy which is understood as metaphysics. How do I want to be recognized? Here we get into the ambit of pasty chocolate with churros or the intriguing Italian caffè ristretto. What do I like the most: delights, whims, cravings, tastes. Am I a Philosopher or Pedagogue? I will define myself as Philosopher of Education. Why? Because I like it better. The sensual is previous to all reasoning.

2. During your productive career you have develop an interesting paradigm that is principally develop in publications about epistemology, anthropology and Axiology of Education. Which of these dimensions do you think is more important in Education?

Something is important as axios - as worth and fair in itself- or as a tekhne –to know how to make things or to modify them—. The first importance is worth in itself and is autonomous. The second importance, however, it is worth as a tool for something else, it is a heteronymous importance that lives from success and failure.

In reference to the educative act, which of these three knowledges are more important? Axiology -knowledge about paradigms, principles, values, dignities- is pending and depending of the philosophical anthropology, or meta-empiric discourse about the human being. If the anthropos ends in hyper-complex, hypertrophic chimpanzee we do not have other values than those flowing through streets and piazzas-the values are, then, the values that are in the minds of the citizens; the values, in such a case, do not exceed the level of neuropsychics and psychosocial valuations -. Conversely, if the anthropos is not reduced to positum, to factum, a simple and brutal data, then, and only then, a value can be more than socio-historic estimation. When the human is understood as something more that a human being, when the human ruptures the corset of the scientifically rational, then it is possible to consider the subject of values, who are
I have written that “are valuables in themselves”; I have not written that “are valuables by themselves”. If we accepted the second exit to the question what is the man? In that case the most important, serious and outstanding in front of the educative act is the anthropology-axiology. In the other hand, if the human is nothing more than the addition of his phenomenons, or ways as is assaulted our sensibility, in that case everything is equally important; namely, nothing matters, everything is plane boring and irrelevant. The drug is used to expel the boredom. There will always be a piece of land where they put us when we arrived to the end of the wall. El “Je regrette d’être né” of Samuel Beckett looks more lucid than the passionate and unrealizable superman of Nietzsche.

We still have the epistemology. This constitutes a metaphysical discourse - beyond any experience- which explores the constituent of not matter what experience-. The knowledge begins to meditate what is knowledge, how many kind of knowledge are, and what is the degree of reliability of each one of them. Who knows better: the mathematician, physicist, surgeon, psychologist, theologian, artist, politician, economist, and engineer or, perchance, the insane and delusional? The epistemology is an organon – an instrument- as Aristotle would say. And the instrumental is mediation or bridge; never shore. The pedagogical knowledges -scientific, teleological, and technological- lose seriousness without reference to the epistemology, but it does not go beyond being a scalpel that never achieves the status of heart surgery for mitral stenosis.

When we educate, we educate someone -anthropology- for something – axiology-. The epistemology is necessary, but never enough.

3. In your works you have defined education in its facticity, as violence, as it is –as we can confirm in your book El atardecer del mal-, but you have also venture into understanding education as what could it be –as seen in your book Finalidades educativas en tiempo de crisis-. You defined the facticity of education using the phenomenological method, while you defined education as a
possibility through the hermeneutics. In Your book *Antropología filosófica de la educación* you distinguish between three types of epistemological knowledge: formal and/or axiomatic, empirical and existential or knowledges of the senses. Both hermeneutics as phenomenology are considered knowledge of sense – reasonable knowledge-. But in the same book you recognize that today’s society shows a strong preference for empirical and formal knowledge because the reason prevails. You have written about the importance of the *Geisteswissenschaften* or knowledge of the sense - as you recognize it-. What is the value of the knowledge of the sense in education?

It have cost thousands of years of blood and sweat to humans to distinguish between knowledge of reality and knowledges of the sense. The hippopotamus has had it much easier because, since it has not left the bulk of reality, for it the reality is not provided. Stimulus -response; nothing else. As we see with the tiny *Drosophila melanogaster*. Doughiness of what there is at the heart of what it is. Without conscience, or discernment of the world as a reality. The sciences occupy their time writing sequentially -with scientific revolutions- about the doughiness and undefined of the world. The scientific narrative about the universe is by itself endless and hypothetical. We do not count with a scientific truth, but with scientific truths, the latest leave the last one in a bad place. Karl Popper has intelligently covered these intellectual embarrassments and indecencies but without suppressing them. When studying the educational facts I approached them as a facticity. What have I discovered? They have all in common being violent. Violence configures the essence that distinguishes them. There is aggression between parents and children, and between the descendants themselves. There is outrage among teachers and students; and violence between the students themselves. Violence focuses the educational act. The knowledge of the educative reality face violence with the same fate as the atomic model of Bohr -1913- subsist in at the nucleus composed of protons and neutrons. Education, as what it is, does not go beyond its violence, as technified as you want it, but violence at the end.

In Dilthey's line, in addition to the *Naturwissenschaften* —knowledge of the reality, as I have call them— we place the *Geisteswissenschaften*, —or knowledge of the
senses, according to my lexicon⁴. One thing is the ordo factus -what has already been done- and the other extremely different in the ordo faciendus -what has to be done-. One thing is the actus hominis -the banal human facticity- and other is the actus humani -those acts that originate humanity in the man-. From this second perspective I have also addressed the educative phenomena; it does not matter any more the education that there is, but the education that would have to be. We are not concern now by the educative reality, but the sense of education. No for the education that there is, but for the possibilities of the education. I defined the educative violence with the method phenomenological; while I have used the Gadamerian Hermeneutics interpreting the educative possibilities. People leave the science to scientists, and the technology for technologists, although, they resort to the doctor, to the pharmacy and to the operating room when their spirit in distress. But, do I have to think? Let’s leave the task of thinking to other. I pay and I can serve myself with their findings and their skills. My chance, they say, is to live from the heart and the suprarenal glands. It does not matter how everything ends, because at the end everything finishes. To such extreme is this that sometimes I had been assaulted with the doubt of whether we have something that is really something rather than elusive wander.

You are telling me, Sandra, that our society values only the empirical knowledge, those that end in utilities, in sleeping pills, in propaganda that makes even sell awful junk as Coca-Cola, in intelligent bombs that seek to dominate the world, in mediator techniques which control the public mores, in diets that help to get slim… What role should we give to the knowledge of the senses in the educative practice? I confess that this issue is not evaluated even at the University, where the educative technology and applied pedagogy enjoy greater respect than, for example, the theory of education or the philosophy of education, that with mercy tolerate each other, especially this second. Stultorum numerus infinitus est, as we read in the Old Testament in the version of San Geronimo. “The number of imbeciles is not quantifiable”. The quantity, no matter how

⁴ The term Geisteswissenschaft, which originated as a translation of David Hume's term Moral sciences, literally means "Science of Mind"; some authors, including Husserl and Rudolf Steiner, have used it to mean "Spiritual Science" or "Science of Spirit".
much is fattens, will never turn into quality. A trendy film is for sure a bad movie. Everybody has gone to see it. Stultorum numerus infinitus est.

The values of the sense are not evaluated. Facticity. From here it does not follow, in logic, that they are not valuable. From the fact that the door is closed it does not mean that it should remain closed. How can we educate our students without having a human paradigm, that sustain the values that operate as teloi, as endeavor, towards what we direct ourselves? The camel just needs stimulus to provide answers; the human being instead gets stunned with the stimulation and needs cultural repertories -among them are the ways of living- in order to respond to their circumstances.

4. How do you define education?

The term education has function in a polysemous way. The definitions obtained are diverse and frequently have been more emotional downloads rather than discourses that refer to a linguistic denotation. I accept the use of the word education to do psychotherapies; it’s a difficult thing to keep the mental health. But I believe that is not enough; this is why I have made an effort to achieve some clarity in this subject. To begin, I maintain that the educational processes are specific to the human being; the human is the unique animal educandum -beast that needs to be educated in order reach the human statute-. Neither the toad, or the flea, nor the elephant, or gorillas have to undergo education in order to embrace the category of toad, flea, elephant, or gorilla. The animals are educable, but in no way they are educands. The circus -an elephant over a stool- and domestic and urban environment- a dog, consoling the psyche of a female, learning not to pee at home- constitute evidence that the beasts are educable, but certainly they are not educands; I dare to say that the elephant of Serengeti -in Tanzania- and the wild dog are more properly elephant, and dog that the poor devils who live in a circus and in a neighborhood house.

The educational human processes are mounted above a specific genetic code amended by maturities processes -set of transactions between biological heritage and the non-human environment consisting of food, water, climate, breathable air ...-. The educational processes come next –conceptually- although they are inexorably intertwined
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with genetics, and the maturities processes. When does the first educative act appear? Right when a zoo group has not enough biological inheritance to pull ahead. When the cultural products have appeared, non-transmissible through the genetic code, there is no other way out for the survival of the new species that rely on the educational processes. What is in this meaning to educate – as “education-learning” or learning? A group of transactions between the genetic code, molded by maturative processes, and the human environment, or civilization. In this sense the educative act involves providing information, awakening attitudes, and facilitating the acquisition of skills. This is how the introduction to the civilization is done -culture or way of seeing the world, technique or ways of modifying the world, and institutions or ways of collectively getting installed in the world-. Sciences and technologies of education are understood in such duties.

If human education was reduced to the previous, it will difficult to discern between animal taming, and education of human beings. However, although it can not be proved -on the meaning of empirical evidence as understood by Galileo— it can be supposed the existence, in man, of realities that are not reducible to phenomena or experiences. The Occidental tradition -from Jews, Greeks and Romans- has made references about the meta-empiric in anthropology. This is how it has been written about the soul, the spirit, self, conscience, freedom, obligation, guilt ..., etc. If exists a sphere that is not subjected to the experience, in such circumstances, and only in such a case, acquires significance to refer to a second educative modality, that I have called liberators educative processes. Because human beings do not only enjoy experiences, but can also be conscious of them, being stuck from them and separated at the same time -the self lives love, tied or glued to it, when the self apperceive his loving experience projecting it to the end of his act of apperceiving it—, because the human being, as I said, discovers himself divided between a living self and a self that projects his experiences as something different of what he had lived, it remains open the sphere of radical freedom. The freedom, origin of responsibility and ontological guilt, opens to the sphere of creativity. Cum haec ita sint -if things are like this- as Cicero shouted in the senate, then I can talk about liberating education; to get liberate, as much as possible, from our informations, affections, and psychomotor activity. Free, however, for what? At this point emerge the
creativity that imagines new societies and new anthropologic models considered more humane. Such creative effort is not individual and narcissistic subject, but a result of dialogue, dialogue that acquires respectability only if starts in the act of conscience that puts everything in front on the screen, instead of leaving the communicators imprisoned by their assurance and pledges.

5. You have indicated that Anthropology and pedagogy are an enriching circularity, what does this circularity involve?

The gnothi seauton -to know yourself or cognosce te in Latin- that was repeated in the walls of the Greek sanctuary of Delphi, and that impressed so much to Socrates, is the proclamation that specifies this eccentric beast that is the human being. What is the human being? “An animal that asks: what is the man?” The dolphin never throws such a worrisome question. It never asks: what is the dolphin? If somebody assured me that these cute animals make this kind of questioning, I will answer that in any case they carry it so hidden that they have not given any proof of this and, therefore, the topics lack of interest. These animals live repeating their monotony; unless we introduce ourselves into their lives, so natural for themselves.

What is the human being? We do not count with the eternal anthropos, which lives beyond time and space. Let us forgive Plato with his eide -plural of eidos, permanent ideal reality, separate from the sensible, immutable, and eternal-. I do not belong to the Platonic confession although I express that his dialogues have stimulated me more than once. What is the human being, then? The endless succession of responses that humanity had been provided. The anthropos is history of anthropos. And, what name should we give to the task of producing human beings? No more or less than paideia, term that Cicero brilliantly translated to Latin, with the signifier humanitas, and that in castellan has been doughtily and scraggily poured with the term of education. Paideia was civilization and civility, is what makes the man to continue without being stopped. The anthropos is what it will be, but it is not yet. The human being is task, duty, and venture; the human being is education. And this is so whether it is considered as an individual or as historic event. Anthropos and paideia, human being and civilizing
process are inherent, to such an extreme that if we remove one of the two nucleuses the other is dissipated, evaporated and extinguished. It is an essential circularity.

6. You explained that you can not conceive education without anthropology. You also define that there are physical, cultural and philosophical anthropology. Why do you focused on the philosophical anthropology, and what is it relation to education?

An **anthropology** –from **anthropos**, the human, and from **logia**, a group of words or systematic thoughts about something–, an **anthropology**, as I said, constitute an organized discourse -the Greek **logos** implies a truth obtained thanks to conclusive argument-. Such organized discourse, for the event, studies the human being. Being the education **anthropo-genesis** or procreation of the man, is evident that is not appropriate to refer to education without simultaneously pointing to anthropology and vice verse; is not a feasible to spoke about the human and, at the same time, to not be accompanied by the realization of the anthropological. Anthropology and education are reciprocates.

Now, the anthropologic knowledge nowadays has been objectified in three very distinct modes: physical anthropology, cultural anthropology and philosophical anthropology. It is true that in most cases the significant **anthropology** is used in the meaning of cultural anthropology. But this does not go beyond being a habit or a tag; I mean a lack of linguistic richness. The truth is rather more complex.

When Galileo uses **scienza nouva** in his book **Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze** -1638- he perceives that his scientific practice is different from it had been done since the Greeks under the name of **episteme -vecchia scienza**-. The new Galilean conception of science rests on the observation and generalized ordering of phenomenons. A mayor fracture has been introduced on epistemology. There is only science of phenomenons -what is sensorial observable-; the rest will be meta-scientific knowledge. Now, leaving aside the axiomatic sciences – mathematics and logic-, result that suddenly appear two kinds of knowledge: the scientific, or from reality and the not scientific or of the sense.
Since, particularly, in the nineteenth century the social sciences started to emerge, which also belong to the knowledge of reality, although they do not enjoy the forcefulness of the Physics. So, we discovered ourselves in front of two forms of knowledge: the knowledge of reality, or scientific, which are either natural or social, and the knowledge of the sense, which is not scientific or is beyond the phenomenons or sensitive experiences.

These three epistemological presentations led to the current three present types of anthropology. The physical anthropology is empirical science of the nature and addresses anatomic-physiological topics of the human. Types of brain -e.g. Brachycephalic and Dolichocephalic-, diversity of races, et cetera. Since Linnaeus the human being has been explored, from this perspective, as one more biological species.

The cultural anthropology is also empirical science, but it’s social or human; it addresses specifically human questions -we have the pancreas in common with other mammals--; what is specifically human is in the culture –ideas, techniques and institutions- Boas, Americanized German, in his book Race, Language und Culture -1940-, sets the foundations of cultural anthropology that, in other nomenclatures, coincides with the ethnology. Sapir, Mead, Lévi-Strauss are other considerable representatives of the cultural anthropology. Both the physical and cultural anthropology are empirical science, although the first treats the man as a piece of nature while the cultural anthropology studies the man throughout socio-historical products. The approach of philosophical anthropology, called by some metaphysical, it is fundamentally different. They do not consider human phenomena –a matter of the science-, but intends to find the meaning or significance of these phenomena. So, one thing is that the human lives the erotic and other very different is to question the why of the human eros; one thing is to live in a society and another different topic is the meaning that this has; to died in the heart of a group, with their funeral ceremonies, is a different theme of what surges when we ask for the sense of the human demise. The philosophical anthropology lives to read the phenomena of the human being beyond all possible phenomenons. It is not about capturing and organizing anthropological phenomenon -which is the task of sciences-, but
to interpret or submit to hermeneutics- it hardly matters, *ad casum*, if it is from Gadamer or Habermas- the human facts, both zoological and cultural.

You are inquiring me, Sandra, for the relationship between educational and philosophical anthropology. Well, look: your curiosity puts the issue of whether the *anthropos* is reduced to facticity, to data, to *posita*, as argues Comte, or an addition to all this, we must also imagine the human being as must-be. The positivism reduced the totality of the anthropos to facts, and reduced the humanity ultimately to set of information. The remaining speeches became chimeras. To observe, and to verify; there is no more. In this way, the philosophical anthropology does not conceptualized the human being in a scientific way so he could also protest, he could go beyond the voice of the donkey, he could be against Auschwitz or against the dictatorship of Stalin.

What would we have from an education devoid of philosophical anthropology? To taming and domestication of beasts; even if they are human and they count with more neurons in the brain, and with more possibilities in the big theater of the world. The philosophical anthropology allows the educational process to not suppress the most exalting possibilities of the human kind like ethics, love, religion, art, and friendship.

7. In your book *Final del Viaje –End of the Journey*- you said that education and man produced a fundamental hermeneutical, but is it possible to define the man without the category of time?

It is not within our power to act or feel, or to think other than temporally, according to sequences. Kant in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* -1781- establishes that the time is the universal sensitive condition -not as well in the space- that makes possible for something to be expressed sensibly. Time makes that the sensible thing expresses itself to me as a perceived object.

The notion of time involves the basic human experience of succession. Whether if the succession is presented with a straight line -like the Abrahamic case of Judaism- as if it is represented as a circle -like the case of the return of Ulysses in the Greek culture-, the human consciousness can only take charge of events successively chained. Moreover,
the humanity confirms the impossibility to change the temporal order, with such a luck that we proof that the events go from past to the future and never the other way around. The relations of succession had given way to the idea of the direction of time. Where is the human being going? What is the telos, exit, fulfillment, realization, or consummation of the anthropos? The man gets conscience of himself as a temporary succession and, at this point, emerge the question about the direction to follow, about the meaning of the human phenomenon.

No, Sandra; it is not possible to define the man without the time, but you can recognize that the temporal experience brings in itself the sense of time, and with it brings also the sense of the human being. The answers to this last question are ad infinitum, and never pronounce the utter. The hermeneutic as understood by Gadamer in Wahrheit und Methode -1960- is an endless reading and rereading of stories. Language and language configure an uninterrupted movement of the finite toward the infinite. We are unable to embrace it because it lies outside of time, but the search for meaning defines the anthropos. This is not conceived sidelined of time, but as an unending effort to leave the temporal. Perhaps it is due to this that Sartre, although somewhat hastily, defined the men as “la pasión inútil de hacerse dios” –the useless passion of becoming god-.

8. How do you define anthropogenesis?

This question is particularly intertwined with the subject of the anthropological time. The human being is not something done; is a chore. In consequence the human being is temporal, that does not end. How to identify, define or clarify the boundaries or confines of the anthropogenesis? This, the anthropogenesis, relies, if we stick to the etymology, to engender the human. But it seems coherent to argue that the man is not concluded not even in a fantasizing idea of the eternal man, neither seems concluded within the core of historical processes. I daresay that the anthropos, rather than being this or beyond -we have plenty of omniscient messianic-, is defined precisely as anthropogenesis. What is, therefore, the human being? It is an animal that has to become human. There is not anthropos; we have only humanization. To humanize, according to
what parameters? Even these constitute a human task. The human values are not given to us since the beginning; we must acquire them painfully through the historical time. The anthropogenesis is unintelligible without reference to the history, which may become a visible symptom of being as temporalization; the human autopyesis was already a renaissance idea; Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola in his book *De hominis dignitate* -1486- affirms that the human being is the sole arbiter of himself. The same is not true with the beasts. The man ends in anthropogenesis; how to take care of a mission so singular and so serious that is the educative activity? Even before, Socrates in the Platonic dialogue *Apologia Sokratous*, talks about it in the last third of a century V B.C.:

Calias, if your two sons were foals or calves, we would have take a caregiver for them and pay him; it should make them fit and in good in the condition that is very natural for them, and it will have to be an expert on horses or a farmer. But since they are men, what caregiver do you intend to take? Who is familiar with this kind of perfection, the human? —20, a-b.

The nature of the human being is not a fact, but at most a tendency with little precision.

The analysis that Heidegger has made about the Dasein –the human entity- in *Sein und Zeit* -1927- understood as possibility, as existence -ex, sistere-, illuminates the question about anthropogenesis. The essence of the human is to have-to-be, while the intrawordly entities are data. The Dasein is a Un-zuhause, a stranger that is in the world according to Unheimlichkeit, the foreignness. The temporality is primary in the human being; the temporality is ekstatikon, it is to be outside of ourselves. The Dasein remains open while the death knocks at the door. The human being does not enjoy of beaten tracks, but only keeps at his side the Feldweg –rural road- and the Holzweg –forest road-. To be human is to remain on track without counting with clear and distinct paths. Heidegger wrote in *Was ist Metaphysik* -1929-:

The nothingness is the condition that makes it possible the disclosure of the entity, as such, for the Dasein -human reality-.

The man becomes a sentinel of the Nothingness.
Despite the fact that St. Augustine Tagaste was dedicated to the subject of time – clearly anthropological in the hands of Augustine- the chapters of the book XI ranging from 13 to 28, can only confess his perplexity at the temporality. What is time?

Si nemo a me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.

The anthropogenesis ends in adventure and boarding because the time, that the human being is, appears as something veiled and mysterious. Not otherwise is understood by St. Augustine in Chapter XXI of the book XI:

At what space of time we measure the time spent? Maybe in the future, depending of what happens? But what it is not yet we can not measure it. Perhaps in the present, wherever it passes? But we can neither measure the space that is void in the present. Could it be, perchance, in the past that has already surpassed? But what is not anymore, we can not longer measure it.

The man-temporality is more questioning that certainty. The anthropogenesis ends in work, commitment, care, and above all in generosity. The anthropogenesis transforms the experience of history into something meaningful. And we constitute the sense linguistically and, in this way, we understand the world and we help in its construction. At the end we define hermeneutics as dialogue; this is, from the attempt of understanding.

Your question, Sandra, appeared as a vocabulary question, but we can realize how serious it was.

9. In your book *Antropología Filosófica de la Educación* -Philosophical Anthropology of education- you said that is indisputable that the human beings belong to the nature, occupies space and time, later you highlight a triple dimension according to which the man is biology –sarx-, culture –psykhe- and biography –pneuma-. You define that sarx, the psychobiological element, is located in the paleocortex -biological brain-; you placed the psyche –the socio-cultural element- in the mesocortex -social brain-; finally, you said that the
pneuma -which corresponds to the spiritual element, and in which you include the concepts of conscience, freedom, creativity and responsibility- is situated by neuroscientists in the neocortex -creative brain-. How these dimensions are related to the human time?

I think is wise, while I do not change my mind, to define the anthropos as sarx, as psycke, and as pneuma, just to use the Greek terminology even if it because nobody uses it anymore. I feel uncomfortable if I am only one piece of the social herd. Globalization and mass-media do not go well with me. That I will end by myself? It does not matter, as long as I am not another sheep of the society.

Neurologists, as Henri Laborit in Biologie et structure -1968-, have referred to paleocortex, mesocortex and neocortex, seeing in these three potentialities of the brain, behaviors that I organize under the Grecian terms of sarx, psykhe and pneuma. In the evolutionary structure of the nervous system it first appeared an elementary brain –paleocortex-, from the reptile, which lives only from the biological heritage placed squarely at the present time. We live from our surroundings and for the surroundings. Millions of years later came a much more complex brain, the one form the mammals for example, and was named mesocortex. Now it is worth, not only the present time, but also the past, what we have been learned after birth. Finally, with the human species and its immediate predecessors the brain is enriched with the neocortex. This gets entangled with the future and works with projects. I had written these things in several of my books which have been useful for my own understanding the complexity of the educative process.

Over the years this tripartite understanding of the human phenomenon and the educative phenomenon was a little too short; it did not let me to breathe comfortably. In my book Antropología filosófica de la educación I looked for a graceful outlet to the intellectual strangulation. I introduce there a new concept, the ruah, drawn from the biblical Hebrew literature. It does not correspond to the Grecian pneuma that privileges the excess and the irrational. Is it audacious? I think it is. I could be call silly and fool. Although at my age such extremes leave me lethargic, I would say, however, let’s do not be so harsh. After all, the correspondence between words and the bulk of the world is
pure subjectivity. What matters is that the anthropological model could be useful, if we want to take care of the accumulation of phenomenons. I think that if we add the image of the Jewish ruah as extravagant and the opposite of wisdom Greco-Roman, to the earlier tripartite model, it could be at least interesting.

How these dimensions are connected to the human time? Under the image of sarx all the present is cover, whether stimulus, excitement or response; namely, the immediate future, which is within our reach. The term psykhe refers to our accumulated past, retained in the memory. I find useful Pneuma to point to the future, to make reference to the human as expectation—as expected, not as waiting-. Decisions, projects, fantasies find their place in the pneuma. But, what do I do with the ruah? It allows me to escape from the seriousness of time and let me understand paideia and anthropos, also as foolishness, immoderation, excesses, and licentiousness. Over the years the sole rationality had ended asphyxiating me. As you can see, Sandra; when we were small we lived with little reason, and now, with so much memory loaded into the biography I yearn for the happiness provided by not being rational or at least, to be very little rational. History -past, present and future- and eternity –licentiousness and immoderation-.

10. From the cited dimensions, what would you consider the starting point for any education? And, could any of these dimensions exist disregarding the other?

The expression starting point is not free from ambiguity, but certainly includes the idea of giving explanation of something. In the fourth century B.C. Aristotle in his work ta physika refers to the arkhai –principles- and the aitiai –causes- of how much appears and how much we study, one and other explaining why something emerge. Seneca in one of his Epistulæ -between the 62 and the 65- translates the Aristotelian text to Latin referring to four causes: material – with what something is produce-, opifex –the author of the product-, shape –what specifies and distinguishes what was produced from other products- and finally the propositum –the mental model that inspired the production and the same producer-.
Interview to Octavi Fullat. Education as Anthropogenesis
Sandra Lilia Galvez de Rudzki

What is the starting point for any education? First, let me state that we have four points of departure and that the four are indiscutible although they play different roles. To begin the education the biological heritage is needed amended by the natural environment -forgive the term sarx to bring such an extent--; this is the material to which Seneca refers. The second point of consideration is the opifex, the craftsman, the educator. The concept of psykhe applies both to designate the educative elements as an action and the results of them. The third subject is the pneuma, the specifically human that distinguishes the results of the educative activity from other possible activities. Seneca define this third cause with the word shape, which translates to the Grecian term morphe. In the translation of the Aristotelian text that Seneca makes there is a fourth cause explaining why something happen in one way or another; it is the propositum or ideal to be followed by the actors. Plato had referred to the exemplary model –eidos-, which can perfectly be injected into the Aristotelian concept of propositum or final cause. My notion of ruah embraces the meta-historical model that ultimately animates the educative processes, that bewitch them and attracts them. Four are, therefore, the starting points for an education encompassing and not amputated.

However, keep in mind, Sandra, that I do not pretend to revel secret of the reality with these nomenclatures, I just dedicate myself to talk about the educative quoad nos; this is, to organize the sphere of the educational so it could intelligible and, also, exciting. I ignore what thing is the real. Neither the physicists are more successful in this topic. The efficiency is not indisputable criteria of a rigorous knowledge.

11. If Sarx refers to biology, what is the difference between man and the other animals?

I understand your question in the sense of what difference can be established between human biology and the biology of other mammals, only, of course, as biological elements. I have used in my writings the Grecian term sarx. I have not always distinguished it from other Hellenic significant related, because my attention was not really to precise the Grecian lexicon, but to choose a term that will attract the attention of a particular semantic field. But you are inviting me to be more explicit.
Paying attention to the Grecian terminology over several centuries -from Homer to the neo-testamentary texts- and without specifying any writer, I consider acceptable to distinguish between soma, zoe or zoion and sarx. The word soma -corpus- in Latin pointed to what is limited, focused, in an extension of space. It’s principally the material that is not alive. The significant zoe, biological life, points to the sphere of the living beings, they are not only located in the space, but they also have uniformly organized all parts of the body. Finally sarx mean human flesh or how the man is somatic and zoetic. The zoe of the whale does not match the sarx, that according to the Gospel attributed to John Evangelist served to the embodiment of the second person Trinity. Let’s recall the text:

El Verbo tomó carne —sarx—
plantó su tienda entre nosotros
y contemplamos su resplendor
resplendor del hijo único del Padre
lleno de ternura y de fidelidad. —1, 14.

The zoe of the whale does not go beyond being body-object, body to the others, so they can see it, hear it, touch it, smell it and even like it. No as well the sarx, this is human flesh, own-body, sensed and experienced as mine. The sarx is distinguished because it is not just a spectacle, but anabasis, selfness or introspection. The human flesh is flesh of a self, Jorge or of Montserrat. The zoe of the whale is the uncouth, it is ownerless; in any case it will be primi capientis- from the one who caught it first.

Besides what I said –the corporeal dimension or soma sarkikon-, the human being emerges among other beasts not only because is a beast, but because he has a pneuma, according to the use of this word that makes Paul of Tarsus in the first letter the Christians of Thessaloniki:

That pneuma —spirit—, psykhe —soul— and sarx —body—, your whole being is disclosed without blemish in the advent of Jesus Christ. —5, 23.
12. In your article *Presupuestos antropológicos de la educación moral* - Anthropologiques Premises for the Moral Education - you say that, the man walks to death building his life biographically through the consciousness. In this journey, what is first: action or thought?

We use the word life both to refer the life of the zebras as to know the life of the Catalan architect Gaudi. The first is biological life, the second is biographical life. The first is concerned about reproduction, nutrition, growth, decrepitude and death, as well as it tries to take over the various sequences and vital rhythms turning them into system based on the homeostatic model. Behind the lives of zebras there is nothing; the biological life is reduced to showcase of phenomenons. Not so the biographical life of Antonio Gaudi; behind the spectacle that he offered and continues to offer, lives the personal conscience of Gaudi. The biographical life is from someone against the biological life, which is of nobody. By so elemental reason, only the biographical lives are subject to morality. Husserl in *Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie* -1913- said that the essence of the consciousness is the intentionality. The self, conscious of his experiences places in front of himself his personal life, which stops being just the addition of sequences becoming an activity that seeks meaning and direction.

In the biographical journey, you are ask me, what's first: action or thought? First as a term can be understood in time or importance. I tend to think that in the temporary course action is the first; however, in terms of importance the thought is placed in the foreground. The action as an action, based on efficiency, appears extremely zoological. It looks like we are something more than a leopard or a lizard.

Even so, it often comes to my mind if whether we proceed properly when we separate discourses and actions. Is it possible to act without a prior scheme of what are we going to do? Moreover, does not our activity powerfully influence our thoughts? Is this circularity indecipherable? Together each human being and the colossal historical movement pull ahead at the same time acting and thinking. Neither Karl Marx alone, nor Max Weber alone; both completing each other.
13. You distinguish three anthropological categories that exist in every civilization: question, possibility and prohibition. You consider the prohibition inseparable to the concepts of culture, technology and institutionalized society. You even explained that “to be educated is to learn the specific prohibitions of a concrete civilization (...), the prohibition inevitably involves the of pain stop living of the necessity and to join the risk of being able to disobey, being in such a way radically guilty or civilized, or educated” (1995; 14-15). You also wrote that it is also through the ideology by which the state makes decisions. You define that "the ideologies are thoughts of action; we do not count with a law on education or with an educational planning which is not ideologically oriented" (1995; 14-15). You add that "the politico-economic projects of education -an educative law, let’s suppose, are equally behaviors that we want to obtain from the citizenship", so the education put us in front of what it should be. What is the role of the law, the normative, and the imperative in the integration process of the individual in the society?

The zoological piece does not live in civilization -culture plus technology, plus social institutions- because it can not ask, and because its life does not consist of possibilities, none of the remaining beasts were discovered under prohibition. We ask because we know that we do not know. The famous "I know that I do not know anything," of Socrates, gets insert in the origin of the specifically human. Heidegger, whom I respect a lot intellectually, in his study Vom Wesser des Grundes -1928 y 1967- wrote: Welt ist nie, sondern Weltet “The world is never given, the world becomes world”. The world is not the totality of real things that are so unspecific known, but it is the condition so the entities could come to meet us, and this happens when we get busy with them -Besorgen-. To ask is to walk busy with the world. Only the human being lives in such a way. Asking is essential to us. The dialogue constitutes a primary questioning, and we dialogue in the polis, not in the radical monacato -in Grecian monakhos means
"lonely". Without other there is not question. Without community –I am write collectivity- the inquiry would not even surface.

In the same text Heidegger writes:

The human reality institutes the world, while only it itself is founded in the middle of what already exists. To *found* means to project our own possibilities.

The anthropos consist in question, inquire, discuss, interpellate. This is a constituent task because there is no world for us without question. The question rests on the need for world; his need is because we have to found ourselves in the midst of what already exists. The mule or the monkeys live directly in the world without even suspecting of the issue of fundamentation. How do we found the world and, in turn, ourselves? We do it projecting our possibilities. The anthropos does not constitute a date, and is defined by the ability to carry out their projects. The colt is what zoology says it is. The man is never defined; the horizon of his potential does not close. The space where the projects are developed is a historic space, is a civilization, is a common life always open.

But the extreme that specifies no matter what historical civilization is the prohibition. The *arkhe* or fundamental principle of any society is the interdiction, interdiction that has not been rationalized altogether. A group naked of prohibition is a zoological group. There is no prohibition of incest between cats or butterflies or deer. A human society is inconceivable without reference to the prohibition; this is why the all anarchist’s attempts for organizing a humane world had failed. Prohibition or law, penalty for the offender and award for the submissive, identifies the factors that organize a *polis*. The State bears the unconditional power to prescribe prohibitions, but it is so shameful that this power must be veil with ideologies. It says, then, that the state is god, or that it represents God; or it declares that the state embodies the will of the people. Ideologies in order to disguise the political obscenities and, of course, anthropological, because deep in the human being, against the beast, it unavoidable shameless and dishonest.

After what I just told Sandra, you can understand that the role of the authority is essential for the socializing process or for the education as learning. If we analyze the
liberating education, the matter gets complex because the social integration does not interest anymore, but gains importance the fact of living from the own act of conscience, which is the source of freedom in front of all that we have learn. However, if there are not cultural processes -learning, for example, of languages-, is not possible even to suggest conscious and freedom, foundation of the liberating education.

14. In the previous questions we have defined the human being as biology and sociology. However, you claim that the man besides being an object -biology and sociology- is also a subject -freedom- but his freedom can not be proven, only postulated (Fullat: 1995; 91). It is in the liberty where the education that goes beyond automation is based. Nevertheless, freedom is part of an utopian discourse, not scientific, is something that can not be touched. Education as learning make us face with what we are, but the education for the liberty make us wish for something beyond. This is why we perceive in the pupil different levels of intentions: what he is, what he should be and what he can become; it introduce us between the meaning of the life experience and the sense of what is to come, between ideology and utopia. We know that in our actuality we can not reunite these intentions; this will only be achieved through the consciousness, as you have acknowledged. Only the conscious allow us to transcend the experience –as it is - and opens us to the future -what could be-. Do you agreed with Paul Ricoeur about the possibility of "attesting the consciousness" through the objectifying mediation of the language?

The Freedom, that is not a result of the adrenal glands, breeds in the act of conscience, which is the act of someone, against what Sartre claims in *La transcendance de l’ego* —1937—, where defines the act of conscience devoid of actor, as if in the theatrical spectacle there were actions but no actors. I think that the reflection about the concept of *parole* de Saussure allows to assert the self, the subject empirical.

I still believe that the act of conscience -as erlebnis or experience, and not as Grecian *chose* or *ousia, subtancia*- plays the mediating role between "what-is" and
"what-can-be". Without consciousness of the circumstance, there is not possibility; we have only the heaviness of the data.

I reply you: my sympathy for Ricoeur is undeniable. Not only captivates me his reflexive ability, but also his honored willingness. I have worked with him in two Congresses of philosophy of France and in a seminar that the University of Gerona organized about his book on *Soi-même comme un Autrein* in the chair of Ferrater Mora. In 1945 Ricoeur was seduced by the *Phénoménologie de la perception* —1945— of Merleau-Ponty; at that time he stared to work in a phenomenology of the action, research that led him defend his Ph.D. thesis on *The Voluntary* in 1950. In the first volume of the *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle* —1989—, he notes the characteristics of his philosophy. He writes:

J’aimerais caractériser la tradition philosophique dont je me réclame par trois traits: elle est dans la ligne d’une philosophie réflexive; elle demeure dans la mouvance de la phénoménologie husserlienne; elle veut être une variante herméneutique de cette phénoménologie.

I arrived to the phenomenology directly through Husserl, and I started living the hermeneutics with the work of Gadamer. When I started my contact with Ricoeur I was already working with the phenomenology and hermeneutics although separately. My proximity to Ricoeur has not made me surrender, for the moment, to a phenomenology hermeneutics.

Four books of Ricoeur have impressed me. They are: *De l’interprétation*, *Essai sur Freud* -1965-, *Temps et Récit* -1983, 1984, 1985-, *Soi-même comme un autre* -1990-, and lastely, *La Mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* -2000-. The self stop being in variable selfness becoming a narrative identity, this is, is built in the change. The conscious self lives from the memory but also from the project, therefore from the future. The story builds language games but also structure the time when narrates, regardless of how the rigid time which with the astronomers and physicists work.

The self has left the transparency of Descartes, exposed in the second meditation of *Meditationes de prima philosophia* -1641-, falling into account that solipsist self can not exist, and that his life is inexorably dialogic. The self discovers himself when
dialogues. The word *parole* de Saussure-, in the phrase and in the text, brings to the daily existence the language -la *langue*- telling something about the world to whom we dialogue with. The universal language does not exist; at most it acts as a regulator idea. From the precariousness we look for new worlds. The context, unavoidable, does not allow us to be transparently universal. Each conscience lives with its pain accompanied of similar suffering.

15. **You have stated on several occasions that the greatest interest of your work is to define the educative reality, what role does the language has in the discovery of this reality?**

What role does the language plays in the educational process? The book *Cours de linguistique générale* -1916-, which contains the courses that Ferdinand de Saussure held in Geneva in 1907, 1908-1909, 1910 and 1911, distinguishes between *langue* tongue -Russian, Catalan, English ...-, and language -Mathematical, ethical, biological ...-, and speech or *parole* -when I, you, he, talk. In the *parole* –speech- we find the particular moment, existed, lived. *Langue* and *language* configured systems, structures, while the *parole* refers to the use of social *langue* and *language*. The systemic perspective according to von Bertalanffy -*General System Theory*, of 1968- let us define the language as a *ordo rerum*. But the language -now understood as something generic- is not reduced to an association of sounds and meanings; it is also a social phenomenon, human action. The *parole* points to this second dimension.

What role plays the language in the educational process? Let's see, in order for me to understand the educational reality I make use of languages as they are linguistic systems, biological languages, psychological, sociological, historical, technological..., and over them I apply the philosophical language in its meaning of metalanguage –one of the philosophical modalities-. Moreover, I had drafted philosophical *metaphysical* language -beyond any experience- in the anthropological, axiological and epistemological fields. These languages had tried to make contributions to improve the educational facts without focusing in the mere intellection.
We still have to address those languages -now *langue*- that are practiced in the act of educating -in the family, at school, in the entertainment...-. It is not a question of defining what happens in education, but of educating. The uttered words constitute fundamental educative factors. The education is communication and is the main resource that uses is the human linguistic code.

16. You expressed concern (Fullat, 1982, p. 24) in "tending albeit quite impossible, to an educational model that helps to develop the existential element of the human kind". Do you believe that exist a pedagogical model that can achieve the consciousness of the individual -or education as self-possession-?

Yes, in the educative act worries me more the education of John or Lupita that whatever happens to the majority, obtained such a result statistically. The educator -mother, father, teacher, educator- is neither pedagogue -expert of the educative act- nor political -Minister or Secretary of Education-. The techno-scientific thinks in general, even in the universal; the same fate proceeds the politician. The latter cares about majority behaviors and, in any way, is interested in the adventure of the singular and non-transferable subject.

You are asking me for a pedagogical model that illuminates the education of each person and not the group. We are talking about a pedagogical model, and therefore a paradigm, Grecian word that acquires its meaning of "model - exemplary" or imitate. We are not talking about the "useful model", to which the physicists refer, for instance, when they talk about the atomic model of the material. These are models that act as mediations to understand something. It is not even talk about a teaching model which allows designing an intervention system modifying the behavior of the pupil. You are asking me for an anthropological and pedagogical model that guides the activity towards the value of the unique conscious of each one. In my University Handbook *Filosofías de la educación. Paideia* -Philosophies of Education. Paideia- I unfold eight anthropological-pedagogic models; the last is developed under the heading Personalist Pedagogy. This is the model in question.
The real person, the one from St. Francis of Assisi and St. Clare of Assisi, has nothing to do with the universal. Francesco would have had to say: simplicity and joy are not in me, but they are mine. One thing is what I am -my nature- and one that is extremely different is who I am –me person-. The nature is possession; the person is the one who has it. Francesco was someone who became something -biography- possessed by him. The self of Francesco consisted in intimacy with himself. This is the essence of the personalist model.

17. **Is the same to educate as self-possession and to educate for the liberty?**

I understand the self-possession of someone as being conscious, from an empiric ego, of his own life as lived in *hic et nunc*. Not a distracted, as they are unfocused, nor an alienated -especially the psychotic- or a drugged even though it uses legal drugs, enjoy self-possession. Survive altered -*alter*, in Latin, the other, the different-.

The act of conscience, as such act, distinguished me and separated me from all my experiences. These rupture between the self that lives, and the same self that is aware, or apperceive, that lives, enables the exercise of freedom. That one or the one, who pulls ahead as glued to the package of its existence that is not aware of it, never will perform acts of freedom transforming his biography in a addition of prescribed sequence. Such is the case of fanatical -religious, political, scientific, aesthetic, moral... That one or the one who does not submit to the doubt their beliefs –group of things that you believe in, even if they are techno Scientifc- ends behaving like a robot for the lack of self-possession. Without doubt there is not freedom.

Free from my own experiences thanks to the act of the consciousness that I have of them. But, free for what? After years of meditations, I can only respond that we are free to inject sense to our biographies, sense that can only be achieved through endless dialogue, and certainly not listening to the messiah. If so, freedom can be defined as the human capacity to provide sense to the biography and history.

Self-possession and Liberty conceptually do not match, but they essentially required each other.
18. You wrote (Fullat, 1995, p.124) that, "in his here (hic) and now (nunc) the human being recognizes his biography as presence, as apperception, is conscious of his/her biological life and biography. The essence of the act of conscious is in the intentionality" How does your concept of intentionality could be related with the concept of consciousness from Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations*?

Husserl published *Méditations cartesiennes* in French on 1931. But even before he had addressed, in a coherent manner, the issue of the intentionality of consciousness in his first book *Ideen zu einer rein Phänomenologie* -1913-. Both Husserl and Freud followed the masterly lectures that Franz Brentano presented in Vienna. Here he understood the value of the medieval *intentio* to distinguish the physical phenomena from the psychics. For Husserl an act would be intentional when it refers to something. When someone is experiencing something he finds himself with another reality that exceeds him. The intentional consciousness is original foundation of sense. The conscience is intertwined with that which is constituted.

Whatever they say, for Husserl what is unquestionable is the subjectivity of intentional conscience. This is called idealism, true idealism, not Berkeley idealism, neither, of course, Hegel’s. Heidegger himself, a disciple of Husserl, made this criticism of his master in *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie* -1963-. The fact of putting the conscience as intentionality does not allow Husserl to place the world as representation of the conscience. The reality that is extern to the conscience, to this thinker, has no other reality that to appear to the conscience. This is Idealism.

My concept of intentionality is certainly from Husserl, but in order to avoid the subjectivist inmanentism and even idealistic, I use alongside the hermeneutics. I understand the texts as objective realities which help analyze our own conscience. The question gets tangled if we attempt to find out the origin of the stories.

19. Do you consider that it is possible to connect our *Being* with our *Possible Being* through the intentionality if the language?
The difference between my being and my possible being lies in that the first is defined by everything that occurs in me, that is observable and, therefore, object of scientific studies. My possibility of being, on the contrary, is unreachable not only by the hands -by the senses- but also for the intellect. My possibility of being depends on the decision, which is based on freedom, freedom that began in the act of conscience. The human being is not only sistencia –from the verb sistere that in Latin meant "to place"-reality placed, detained, consolidated, erected, as the other things in the world; is also -and this is what stands out -ex-sistencia. The Latin preposition ex indicated the "from". Ex-sistencia points to be leaving without resting from what we are, safe and unfailing, to enter to what we are not yet, to the unknown, the questionable, the vulnerable, and the uncertain. The ex-sistencia makes us tragic; we are entities that are what we are not yet. The sartrian analysis of the first chapter of the second part of L'être et le néant -1943-which is entitled Les structures immédiates du pour-soi, impressed me the day that I read them –there have been many years since then- and still they continue stimulating me. Could the intentionality of the language reunite my being and my possibility of being? According to Heidegger language is “the house of the being"," is “the location of the human essence". It seems, therefore, that the speech is the space where the questions concerning the man can be resolve. Language makes possible a transcendental hermeneutics of the anthropos interpreting the communicative intelligence of him and also the intelligence that the man attempts of himself. Plato noted in the Sophistes and Peri tou ontos that "the thought is the dialogue, without sound, of the soul whit herself" -263, d.

The language has two functions: the representation of the world and the communication between fellows. The first function produces syntactic-semantic systems; and the second, on the other hand, refers to the universal pragmatic competence. What intentionality does it have? Socrates, the one of the first platonic dialogues, was reluctant to reduce the dialogue to rhetorical techniques. The dialogue goes beyond making an effort to liberate the human being from their immediateness –the being- giving him access to the Good –Agathon-, which is condition of a moral and civic life that does not
destroy itself –possibility of being-. In dialogic speech I discover the intentionality that allows me to connect the human being and possibility of being.

20. Do you consider that the narrative novel -or mythical story- can certify the relationship between noesis and noema through the intentionality of the language?

Suddenly surges a important concern: how does the language can be studied by the language? We can only count with the recourse of the meta-language. However, this implies that the universal language does not exists having only regional languages. From one language we analyze another. The Truth, then, stays buried. Only survive truths. And still other concerns: what relationship exists between language and world? How is it possible the linguistic significance? How to clarify the relationship between medieval signans –signifier-, signatum –meaning- and denotatum -referent? You, Sandra, are asking about the mythical story, but, of course, it is also touched by the questions above.

The myth is a message presented as a narrative, through which a group of people passed on from generation to generation what is essential to keep in memory, because it encloses a past illuminator of all the present and every thing in the future. The myth safeguards the group. This is, at least, its function.

The story responds to the historic structure of man. We do not count with universal history, but with countless stories by themselves unfinished. The time of the story is not independent at all from the real time of the event, or from the temporality of the reader. In the first volume of Temps et récit -1983 - Ricoeur writes:

Le temps devient temps humain dans la mesure où il est articulé sur un mode narratif, et le récit atteint sa signification plénière quand il devient une condition de l’expérience temporelle.

Time and story are related through human action when it comes narrated. It does not interest in the case the syntactic, or the semantic order of the language, but the pragmatic order including the performative sentence. But, what is the world with regard to the consciousness we have of it? Responds Husserl in the first book of Ideen -1913:
The nature is only possible as a intentional unit of the conscience ... The nature manifests itself as a correlate of conscience.

The things are constituted, according to Husserl, through sedimentation of meanings. In the origin of such sedimentations we placed the Glaube –faith- the belief, prior to knowledge itself. What it shows ends, with that luck, reduced to how is it show. We are already in the heart of your question, Sandra, somewhat complicated. The unity of the subject is precisely, genetic, narrable therefore. In Méditations cartésiennes -1931- reads:

The ego is constituted in the unity of a story

The Self, configured in this way, makes the phenomenological analysis in two directions, the noesis and the noema. The noesis is the moment of conscience in which it provides direction; the noesis is the essence of the act of thinking. The noema, nevertheless, is the correlative of an act of conscience, is an instant of the intentional life of consciousness and is part of the experiences of it.

The mythical stories do not describe the world; they are sequenced noemas that depart from the intentional noesis objectified, linguistically, at last.

21. Paul Ricoeur wrote in his Self-comprehension and History that the understanding of oneself is a narrative from one extreme to another. The self comprehension is to appropriate of the history of one's own life. However, to comprehend this story is to make a narrative of it, lead by the stories, both historical and fictional, we had understood and loved. This is how we become readers of our own lives. Within your extensive work you wrote a trilogy of books -narrative novel-. The narrative novel involves numerous similarities that between the novel characters and your own life. For instance: The Professor, which is the main character teaches philosophy at the Autonomous University of Barcelona –as you did in that time--; the students with whom The Professor meets for discussions have the same names of the students that you were teaching then; the multiples trips that The Professor performed relate to the travels that you have also done; the friends of The Professor are also your
friends –e.g. Jassans that in the novel is a sculptor and Professor of Greece, and who in real life is a prominent sculptor friend of yours, your schoolmate from your studies in Paris, etc.). Do you accept the possibility of intertwining and decentralizing your own experiences through the narrative novel?

Do you Accept, the intertwining and decentralization of your own experiences through his trilogy of narratives essays? This demand forces me to make an incursion by the lands of my unconscious. However, I do not dare because I do not dominate, even by far the psychoanalytic techniques, which furthermore would have to put into practice myself. To me is easier to answer you with a philosophical analysis which tries to define what is the person, this persistent intimacy that insufflate us security and firmness, so indispensable, one and other, so we to despair.

The only way to access the whom of the singular existence consists in using the narrative story of the actions undertaken by the supposed self. The self, actor of a biography, has been referred, refers, and will continue referring- until standing definitively, in hour mortis- to oneself, to the others and to the circumstance. Life is definitive until it embraces the definitive and at that moment the life ends. My existence has have sense and continues having it because I have treat myself, the neighbors and the world. The existence –Dasein-, of relying on Sein und Zeit -1927- of Heidegger, consist in sein in der Welt -world as a Umwelt-, and also in Mit-sein, "being-with". I have been myself thanks to the environment. My Self is unintelligible without the addition of experiences. My person becomes present to me renewing the retention and being disposed to live expectantly. I am not just a throw entity; I also consist in project. Between the first and the second stretches the work of my life until the present in which I am still alive. The fall of the curtain will close all expectations.

My written work also allows somebody see into my self. My narrative books -the trilogy- I suppose that allow catching a glimpse of my person even in the midst of translucent veils. My speech and my writing make it possible for others to know me. The personal speech left almost naked the secret of life. The death will provide, finally,
absolute sense to my self. The cadaver does not speak, does not communicate, it remains silent even if you insult it.

The trilogy of Eulalia is an effort of individual analysis and was drafted with the despair of finding meaning both to the biography as well as to the history. Not being satisfied with the worldhood events, it explores beyond of them. I do not want to carry my life as if it were a bulk; I want to accept it with joy. But this is not an easy or enjoyable task.

My trilogy, Sandra, I think it is halfway between a novel and romance –Anglo Saxon terminology in the narrative work-, midway between mimesis and imagination. I use the literary genre in a spirit of illuminating non-literary events. The book Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque -1961- from René Girard may prove useful to unveil my three texts.

Disposed to answer your precise interrogation I am inclined to say yes, that you are right, keeping in mind, what I have clarified you.

22. The question that guides the entire route of the narrative work comes from The Professor who considered himself sick of ignorance and furthermore decides to investigate where does the time of the humanity leads? You make a clear distinction between biographical time –existence- and historical time -the essence- Is the past, present, future, or the ecstasy of the three times what gives meaning to the human?

Past, Present and Future, can they give meaning to human beings? Let me answer you briefly, directly, short and snappy, succinct I would say.

The non-human have retentive –a way that does not escape the past, at all- and sensations and answer- a way to hold to the present-. But, by chance the zoon looks to the future? At the most looks at it as awaited -like the cat waiting with their muscles for the mouse to leave its hiding place- but never as expected –awaiting better times - and even less as a way of hope –I am jumping from the time to the "off-time".

The human being is an animal that is specified to live according to the future. However, the tension "past-present-future” only raises the question of meaning, but never
surrenders to the meaning. It waits inevitably on the unattainable horizon. The *anthropos* yearn for the meaning of existence, but it is not within its power the embrace it. At least does not embrace it in the womb of the historical processes.

23. In your book *El pasmo de ser hombre – The Astonishment of Being Human* you made an introduction en which you recognized yourself as “socially codified”. You said, “I was an cenobite of the civilized space -?- of Barcelona or, if I should say, of an area slightly larger confusingly covering what is call Iberian Peninsula and French hexagon (...). I was, then, a piece of common life; I was peopling, mass, crowd, public, town, neighborhood. The mob. Without noticing, as any other cenobite, I had become in puppet, dummy, scarecrow… abreast of my country under the guise of being social animal… Mi biography was reduced to be the other -alterum-, it was reduced to be distress, excitement and disorder; I was, as everybody, decomposed, changed, agitated, stifled (...).I am not one of those who believe that the more socialized, the more humane I am; no. My intention is not to belong to the mixed *animalia*, but to be proper animal. I opted to *desérere*, to escape, to separate myself, to leave to the desert. I began an *anabasis* or expedition to my own interior. I searched for the recato, retreat and meditation. I moved away so I could break up my social codification –as much as possible-"(Fullat: 1994; 12). Can we match this definition –to be socially codified- with what you call *education as learning*?

In this regard, my answer is resolute. Yes. This is a description, more or less literary, of the *education as learning*.

24. Paul Ricoeur in his book *Oneself as Another* defined two terms of identity: *identity as idem* and *identity as ipse*. I understand that Ricoeur has been a reference in some of your works, so I omit the definition that Ricoeur gives to these two types of identity. My question is: Is it possible to match what you identify as "education as mechanization" to the definition of sameness -or with the permanence over time- that defines Ricoeur?
Soi-même comme un autre -1990- is the result of Ricoeur Gifford lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh. In the book he takes up the major themes of his career, from the notion je peux recalls the je peux parler -language analysis-, the je peux agir -studies of the voluntary and the action-, and remains open to the next book, Temps et Récit with the je peux raconter. Besides he does not lose sight of the je suis imputable -ethics and politics- which closes its vast thematic. In Soi-même comme un autre he addresses the human subject distinguishing the human figure of mêmeté, thanks to which a subject lasts over time, and the figure of the ipséité, by which the subject is a unrepeatable and lonely singularity. His approach wants to escape both of the ego cogito Cartesian, a sovereign and secure self, and the subject considered by Nietzsche as multiple and humiliated self that is no longer origin of truth. Ricoeur returns to the soi-même but this is a movement towards soi-même comme un autre. The self that he returns to have lost the beauty and clarity of Descartes being a oneself surrounded by darkness, but avoids falling into the demoralized consciousness of Heidegger -without morals because there is only time-. For Ricoeur, on the other hand, the conscience calls silently without losing, in this way, the ethics. Overall, the subject is vulnerable.

I distinguish between the education that shapes robots and education that seeks to engender people self-possessed. The one who is educated by the first education is an altered, an individual or psychosomatic unit, programmed by the genetic code and reprogrammed by the social code. Conversely, the educated by the liberating education is a self-possessed or someone in possession of himself; this person lives from the future, from utopias. This second is a person -for me a person is not something, but a personalization, is a process-. The first student, the robotic, does not go beyond the status of individual, of psychosomatic unit, which is, for example, similar to the bat that starts flying at the beginning of the darkness. The altered pupil, or robotic, and the self-possessed student, or educated in auto possession, constitute two paradigms extremes that allow a wide range of activity between one and the other. These are images that facilitate the understanding how a specific educative task I developed.
Can we establish analogies between *mème* and student-robot? No doubt. I could also answer the same regarding the *ipse* and self-possessed educated. However, Sandra, I had never made that comparison although I discover a good hypothesis in this case.

25. You had asked yourself on other occasions "why educators and pupils ambition the other, so other, that is not longer education?" Is it possible to compare what you identified as educating for self-possession with the definition of *ipseidad* of Paul Ricoeur?

Here I can respond you categorically. The *ipseidad* of Ricoeur fits with my education for self-possession.

26. Your trilogy -narrative novel- ends with the "failure" of The Professor –who was unable to find the answer to his question related with the direction of the human time-. The Professor, afterwards, remains suspended in Hope. However, in your book *Els valors d'Occident* –The Occidental Values- you refer to the interpretation of the works: the Aeneid, Genesis and Odyssey, do you think that the possibility of finding the meaning of human kind lies in the past?

Yes, The Professor fails. The reason fails. The Illustration has not saves us. The book *Dialektik der Aufklärung* -1947- form Adorno and Horkheimer force us to think about the dangers of the reason. The direction that animates my latest work –among them stands out, for the moment, *Els valors d'Occident*- aims to untie the knot that Eulalia left us with her death. Can the mere testimony of a life answer the question about whether we should be morals? I do not thrive to see how some honest actions can be valuable in front of a question that goes directed to the intellect. What kind of reasons do we have so we can be good? Nietzsche left us orphans; he writes in *Götterdämmerung*, published in -1988-1889- that the Truth is the big Lie that the Reason has left us, "old misleading female."

The hermeneutics of Gadamer has helped me to rethink the subject. *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. -1960- Some chapters
more than others, it is a work that has assisted me. I start from the assumption it does exist neither a universal language nor universal tongue. And even less, of course the unlimited parole. How to bring up the universal anthropological values or Droits de l’homme et du citoyen –the tragicomic Révolution française developed in a few years three Déclarations, the one in 1789, in 1793 and 1795-? Faced with such a narrow perspective I have estimated sane to stick to the language and langues’ of the West, where there have been considerable works about the kind of extreme that alarms me. Our collective memory, which in no way results ecumenical, has been shape living with blood, although it has not missed moments of distention. In the first origin, Torah –Jerusalem-, Odysseia -Athens- and Aeneida -Rome- starts our memory as Westerners; then from the Council I of Ephesus -325-, the Christianity synthesizes culturally the dialectic between the prophecy, or the value of the sense, and the techno-science or the value of knowledge and effectiveness. During the Renaissance, begins the disintegration of the Christian synthesis valuating only scientific reason and technical reason. With Nietzsche even the Reason dies.

What to do? The Western writings objectify and sediment centuries and centuries of search for the sense of the historical process in a precise geographical area which has been expanded to the American continent, Australia and New Zealand. Over the centuries has been drawn an axiological persistence that finally reaches us. Millions of ancestors living the questioning of the, Why to keep going? The writers have objectified the craving and the hopes of millions of people. It makes sense to argue that the values that have been thrown forward have become for us, respectable Western values. The axiological list is not closed, but it is there, written, and it request us. We do not have proof of the moral obligation, but it must be recognized that the millennial history of suffering and waiting is more honorable that the vote that some illiterate make in a parliament –the politicians do not read; they believe they are demigods because the ideology, which works for them so well, says that they represent the people.

No. The sense is not hiding in the past. It is not hidden behind any time. The sense is what we find out without taking any rest. This is it but only with hope, although it is not theological. What happens is that in order to talk about the meaning of the
anthropological is not necessary to start from scratch, as if the human phenomenon was a thing outside of this moment and not aged in our millennia of ancient Mediterranean basin. We grieve the present because it progresses blind, for this reason we read the past - anamnesis- so that, commenting, it enlightens us in the current emergencies and this is done, inexorably, with the aim of producing senses, or legitimization, of existing, for the moment, tranquilizing the desire to live sensibly -reference to the phronesis of Aristotle in his ta meta ta physika.

27. In the same book, Els valors d’Occident, you make a reference to an anthropological triangle symbolizing the cultures: Greek, Roman and Hebrew, to which you access through interpretation of the mythic narratives: the Aeneid, Genesis and Odyssey with the purpose of identifying the values of the western world. Do you think it is possible to obtain a universal model of values from this book?

No. Categorically, no. The people of the Mediterranean formulate questions and provide answers that we do not see, for example, in the Brahmanism civilization -Vedism and Vedanta. I would say the same regarding to the Confucianism and the Chinese neo-Confucianism; these are understandings produced apart. The gullibility, snobbery and economic gain have imagined bridges between beaches that were wet by different seas. The ecumenism, the we are all the same, or is dictatorial impudence that conceals in this way his excess, or is simplicity and even foolishness. These are people who have read very little and no well.

I can not see how the universal values can be obtained. Until the present, the values have been characteristics of a concrete civilization. Thus, the values of Islam do not coincide with the Christians or with the brahmanics. Moreover, to affirm that our own values are universal constitutes a morbid megalomania. Habermas in the two volumes of Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns -1981- declared the pretention of the Universalist pretension of the pragmatic linguistic but he could not substantiate it. For this reason Apel, already in his Transformation der Philosophie -1973- imitating Kant, seeks to substantiate a priori the axiological propositions.
I prefer to stay with the West and with Gadamer. Why? I think it wiser and handier. The universalisms run away from the specifically real, they are afraid of the man of flesh and blood, of which Unamuno wrote. The Universalists tend to be cowards, as the pacifists.

28. On several occasions you have expressed dissatisfaction with education, in the West, because it lacks of values that are "universal and necessary". Nevertheless, in 1996 you published the book *Las Finalidades educativas en tiempo de crisis* –The Educative Finalities in Times of Crisis- in which you propose some stylized finalities; do you consider current those finalities to which you aim -sensory pleasure, utopian progress, acceptance of the limits, communication between neighbors, artistic escape, hope in the Absolute, creative doubt, Socratic irony, ignorant wisdom and ethical-minded individual? My university training, in fully dictatorship of General Franco, was scholasticism. The program of the career of philosophy ended the history of philosophical thought with Hegel. It was significant. My intellectual overturn occurs in Paris during 1970-1971 when I was enjoying an excellent French Government scholarship to study with Michel Foucault, with Levi-Strauss, and with Wahl and Vuillemin. I am telling you this, Sandra, because this is how emerged my first philosophical discourse that justified metaphysically -ens, unum, bonum atque pulchrum convertuntur- the ethical values. The book *Finalidades educativas en tiempo de crisis* -which incidentally I published in 1982- represents a protest against scholasticism, which I was formed in, but I do not succeeded then to dispute seriously in my proposal. It was more like a kick than a fine argument.

Would I accept now the stylized finalities? I would, with the condition of considering them provisional, and as an emergency exit in an overwhelmed and reckless society.

29. What values do you think that should to be included in education?

But I add something thinking about educators and pupils. We suffer the harassment and the pressure of messiahs and multicolored rescuers -church, politicians, trade unionists, artists, scientists, and technologists, visionary of all type...-, all of them assure us that they have the secret, the intellectual potion, that will make us good and happy. These charlatans have filled the history of the West, is not therefore, just a current proceed. Faced with so many redeeming contents –we have to do this or that; to think in this way and not in a different way- I think that the original value is no other than to be aware of what we are told and of what we live for, so, in this way, we become separated from so many drivel and foolishness proposals. To begin is necessary to live in doubt and in an intimate loneliness. That the child can not live yet in such existential distress? Well, he/she has to wait until propitious time. But, before we digest oafish values, we have to start being ourselves. This is the original value of all unique human life. Doubt, irony, silence, withdrawal, and consciousness of what surround me; this is, we all have to keep an eye on the circumstances. Only later, helped by the dialogue, we will decide the values. We will, probably, just end accepting the values of charlatans, but at least, before, I had laughed of their occurrences, whatever. Without sense of humor there is not human being. No mule laughs when you tell it a joke, or a moral, aesthetic, or scientific doctrine. They listen to this with imperturbable character. The first value of the educational process is to be aware of not getting confused with our circumstances.

Catharsis

Aranguren writes in his book Crítica y meditación that "to look backwards moves us almost always to the nostalgia, or the self-criticism, or both; is like saying goodbye to what we have been until now, and the beginning of what we are disposed to be, is to we go back to change again and again. The returns sometimes mean the conclusion of a stage in the sequence of life, on behalf of the beginning of another, or the conclusion of the pure and simple intellectual and vitally active life ". Your
autobiography that was published in the Journal *Anthropos* shows that you have been in constant confrontation with your own schemes. In *Mis fragilidades de existir pensando* –My fragilities of living thing- (1994, 160) you wrote that "is not easy to get rid of a constitutive piece of one's beliefs. Deep inside, we do not have beliefs, they have us and they constitute the backbone of our lives".

30. Do you think that there have been stages of your life that had put you in a tension between what you want to do and what the institutions -let’s call them State, family, religion, etc…- ask you to do, and how this situation has affected the meaning of your own life?

What you had just asked, Sandra, is a harder matter than it seems at first sight. Of course you are not asking me directly about this business in general, but you are inquiring how it has gone, in my life, the task of unveiled it or, perchance, to dismiss it. You mean the tension between the self, of everyone, and the institutions in which the system prevails inexorably over the singularities. Your question openly points to the agony -in Greek *agon* were: racing, combat, war- between the singular and concrete -a biography, for example, of flesh and blood- on the one hand, and the system -a historic society, let’s suppose-. My life as any other life that refuses to disappear, as uniqueness, can only become *polemos*, in *bellum*, between the self conscious and the social structure in which is inserted. The confrontation between these two extremes only dies with the death of the self.

Albert Camus raises the agonizing issue of human being in the theatrical piece *Les Justes* -1950-. Kaliayev loves Dora and also the innocence of the small nephews of the Grand Duke of Moscow. For this last reason he does not toss the bomb at the carriage. When the institution demands justification for not having obeyed, shouting responds:

I love those living today on the same land that I... For them I fight and consent to die. For a distant city, from which I am also not sure, I will not go to beat the face of my brothers.
Hegel in his capital book *Phänomenologie des Geistes* -1807- defends the resolution of the conflict between conscious of the self –subjectivity- and conscience of all –objectivity-. He imagines the reconciliation between the two opposed in the last part, the VIII, which deals with the Absolute knowledge. Just as divine self, Jesus, died and then resurrected after in the community, in the same way the singular Self will die for the benefit of the universal we. The mission of each person is none other than to lead, a bit later, the weight of the Spirit.

Sandra: I had preferred the tragedy of existentialism before the reconciliation of Hegelian idealism. I refuse to give up the life of my Self. And what happened to my biography as a result of my pronouncement? "I confronted the institutional authorities. I have had conflicts with the ecclesiastic hierarchy –I would never tolerate the omniscience papal denying, in consequence, the censorship of my writings; I had sustained battles with the faculty authorities, the rector of the University of Barcelona and the Minister of Education of the General Franco, because I did not surrender to the order of not teaching the existentialism, Marxism and anarchism in the university classrooms. The police tackle me. An institution, however, was always in my side; it was my family. Have such adventures affected my personal life? I respond you that rather than affect it, they have made it, realized, and produced. I can not separate my biography and my struggles. I suspect, however, that this is the case in all conscious human lives.

31. **Would you write a narrative novel again?**

Would I write another narrative novel? On the one hand I must confess you a certain reluctance because I do not consider myself in possession of literary skills, but on the other hand I am attracted to the project because my temper more existentialist than systematic, as I outlined in your previous question, leads me to use a procedure more suitable to save the self for each one.

32. **Dr. Octavi I understand that currently you are working on a dense book, which of the three lines that you have developed is the one that you expand in this book: epistemology, anthropology or axiology?**
Yes, I am working on a vast work; some ideas have already emerged more or less in specifics books and magazines. I suspect that with around a thousand pages I will achieved my ambition: to offer some respectable values for the West, values that are worth because they constitute the objectification of tears, blood and also brief enjoyment of millions of human beings who have sought for sensible sense of history, meaning that inject courage to the future. Do I include in that book, epistemology, anthropology or axiology? If the darkness of the night does not prevent it, it will be anthropology axiological.

33. Lastly, Dr. Octavi would the book, which you are working on, enlighten current pressing problems such as global terrorism?

Indeed, the globalization is not confined to the economic and cultural areas; it has also expanded into the sphere of crime. The political of the chaos, which was unambiguously expressed the September 11, 2001, has put on the table the globalization of the nihilism against the societies structured in form of states, which are losing sovereignty, and can no longer sustain the safety of citizens, against the social pact envisioned by Hobbes in the Leviathan. The democratic societies are the most vulnerable because in them almost nothing is prohibited, and without prohibition the society disappears.

What does the issue that I investigate suggests in this subject? If I accept the methodology of Max Weber –both in L’éthique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme, according to the French version, as in his posthumous book Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, of 1922- if I accept, as I said, the Weberian methodology it takes me to a hypothesis for a research parallel to the task I have now in my hands. It is the following. The Weltanschauungen with monotheistic religions -with a single god, and in addition personal- are discernible historically in dominant forms, and at the same time exclusive: Holy War, Crusade, and Army of god. In addition they evolve with utmost difficulty. They tend to involve in themselves. They have the truth and goodness of the history; the rest of humanity lives on the error and the malevolence. The unique God leaves guarantor of them.
The religions of vague divinity and impersonal –god is not something, not someone- as the case of Brahmanism, Confucianism, Shinto, Buddhism ... by not having a clear dogmatic and closed, are more accommodating and open to dialogue. The polytheisms also possess a polymorphous and versatile creed.

The Christianity offers an originality that places him apart. Being the synthesis of Jewish monotheism and paganism Greco-Romano, their objectification in history is ambiguous offering alternately dictatorial and fraternal face. If, on the other hand, we realize that from the Renaissance Christian ambiguity begins to rid in benefit of the techno scientific Greco-Roman paganism, and we equally fall into the account that after Nietzsche the Christianity had dead sociologically, then we should not count with it for my hypothesis. Its residual social force now rests on the economic power.

In order to explain the current globalization of terror, we only have the Judaism and Islam; both equally intransigent because they both speak, and act -because the absolute god embodies *aliquo modo* in them-. Since there are only 14 million of Jews compared to 1,127 million of Muslims, it is clear, despite the money from the first, that the only group to keep present in my anthropological hypothesis is the Islam.

Well, Sandra, is only a hypothesis suggested by my current studies, a hypothesis that I do not work because I occupied myself trying to find out the axiology of the West. It could be a hypothesis exposed helter-skelter and therefore without future. I do not know whether one day I will have time to deal with it. I confess that I am tempted, but it demands for too many years for my age, you know, I am *provectae aetatis* - of advance age.

34. **Doctor Octavi suddenly comes to my mind a question out of the argument, was it worth to come to the existence?**

Yes, even if it was just for asking a disturbing question and then go. I can guess what you are thinking…

35. **And those who suffer distressingly?**

Look Sandra; the suicide will always be more than the nothingness.
Dr. Octavi since the last time that we met, for the presentation of my doctoral dissertation *La Educación como Antropogénesis. El tiempo como categoría Pedagógica en el Pensamiento de Octavi Fullat* you had finished the book *Los valores de Occidente* in which you were working back then. I know that you have been traveling for teaching curses and conferences in Mexico and in France, and that you have started a reflexive journey about your own life that you present in your *Memories* that will be published in three books, one of which has already been published.

1. Although it could be obvious I would like to know, what is the principal motivation that induces you to write your memories?

No, is not an obvious issue, usual or ordinary what triggers the three volumes of my *Memories*, it is rather entangled and confusing. I even dare to argue that is masked.

We do not consist, Sandra, in this or that; we are narrated time, biography, and we are not by accident or coincidence, but *per modum essentiae*, we are essentially story. What relationship to establish between a narrative utterance and a real event? Everyone belongs to its own temporality as is narrated. Our existential entity is historic taking form with meaningful fragments that only the exposition can articulate. Human lives as biographies inject meaning into what would only be chaotic mess. Extra linguistic time and time of language –the tenses verbs- kiss each other in the story; it acts as a mediator between lived time and time told as a story. This is the case of *Confessiones* of Augustine of Tagaste written in the year 400.

In line brought in by Paul Ricoeur in *Temps et récit* -I, 3, Seuil, Paris, 1983, p. 105- *time -khronos or zeit*- converts in human when gets articulated narratively. The intrigue -mimesis in the *Peri poietikés* of Aristotle when we approach the study of the tragedy in Chapter 6- the intrigue, as I was telling you, inoculates significance in a
succession of empirical occurrences. Every human identity remains oriented thanks to the unique experience of time.

I did not assert to be me until the day I narrated myself globally. But here jumped the unexpected and at the same time perturbing and even subversive. This traumatism has taken place when trying to convert into written text, and explain it, the story of my life, story which was sleepy in the womb of the gloomy.

It raised in 1975 my eagerness to read systematically to Sigmund Freud. I discovered thus the *Tiefenpsychologie* or psychology from the depths which focus in the study of unconscious processes. The unconscious formations are sorted around the *Verdrängung* or repression. And Freud convinces the self that he is not the owner of his house against what was sustained by Descartes with his *Ego cógito*. In writing my memories I become in an exploratory of my personal obscurities.

Why Freud becomes catapult for me? Without doubt because, invariable, I have failed in my plan to be culturally happy. The immediate conscious *ego cógito cogitatum*, is certainly confident but by no means true. The self, myself, is not the *who* of the Cartesian *cogito*, but the *what* of the ignored desire and clandestine that lives in the depths of the early experiences of satisfaction.

The unfolded theory in the *Traumdeutung* of 1900 is summarized with a phrase taken from the same book, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which reads: “A dream is the veiled realization of a repressed desire”. *The Traumdeutung* says, in addition that in the dream, as a story, desire and language touch each other, both of which get articulated in the dreams.

*Zensur*, censorship, in the first topical Freudian is defined as a function that prohibits the unconscious desires and formations arising from them, the access to the pre-conscious-conscious system. In the same *Die Traumdeutung* develops such doctrine. Commonly the unconscious is constituted by a group of censored contents which had not been allowed to entry into the field pre-conscious-conscious. The unconscious to the extent that is censored is revealed only as text, as the text of a dream or the text of someone's life.
Interview to Octavi Fullat. Education as Anthropogenesis
Sandra Lilia Galvez de Rudzki

Do you realize, Sandra, the labyrinthine what it is the theme of my memories? Those who read it only as an addition of data and references would lose the unifying force of them. In them roam freely all my disturbances and unconscious eddies. The memories largely constitute a psychotherapy conducted savagely.

36. Has there been some biographical paragraph that forced you to regret, or that has made you wish to act in a different way as you were living it?

If I distinguish in my psyche between unconscious system and pre-conscience-conscious system then I discover that in the sphere of apperceiving me there is nothing which I would regret despite that behaviors and occurrences have ended being opposed and antagonistic to one another. I suspect, Sandra, that a biography is a compendium of nonsense and gibberish. We are only units and coherences or links as an ideal limit but never in the field of facts. I embrace my past that same way that have wander the days of my years and without wanting to dash or dispel any of them. I am what I have been. If you delete a single plot or a tiny speck of my existence I stop immediately being myself.

If, on the other hand, I pay attention to my unconscious requests, in that case, Sandra, I am speechless because so ominous and gloomy I see this basement that I do not assert to tell you even what moves in it.

37. The "return" to which your Memories send you, do they mean the end of one stage of your life, we might say academically, or could it be the beginning of what will take you on new ways?

My Memories, indeed, set a return, an anabasis or expedition to the interior; but my return does not match that of Ulysses. His return was nostos, from where nostalgia comes. Homer defines the hero of the Odyssey by their intolerable remoteness that forces him to return to his homeland, the secure, and the reliable, to his wife Penelope with whom he wants to age together instead of carrying out such work alone, desolately. Also, as Ulysses visited the country from the dead, or Nekyia -my unconscious and nothing else- is not to resuscitate, but only in the spirit of view clearly who I am. I maintain the
same about my *katábasis* or descent into hell of the subconscious. Who am I as integrity, not only in epidermal, shallow and trivial?

However, if we trust, Sandra, the commentary that makes public Aristotle about the *Odyssey* in his Poetics -*Peri-poietikēs*-, then my return would be equal to that of Ulysses. Aristotle wrote: “This is a complex poem since the beginning until the end is *anagnorisis* -recognition-.” I also transit from ignorance to knowledge, knowledge of myself. My memories end in search of identity departing from the global story of the biography; this fact does not deny, on the other hand, that we also which also depend and rely on the eyes of others to be constitute at all. Is it possible the *philautia* or love of myself? In my case I would venture that the return becomes self-constitution even if it is unfortunate and eventually pitiful.

No, dear Sandra, at my eighty years I do not finish a stage to initiate another. I am solely missing to start the stage of absolute death. Penelope has died; my sister Maria has been more than four months in the grave in the cemetery of *Montjuïc* in Barcelona. The return of Ulysses has no longer significance. I am aimlessly.

As you know, the phenomenological hermeneutics described by Paul Ricoeur, in his book *Oneself as Another* was the methodological basis in the development of my doctoral thesis. Paul Ricoeur suggests the "ontology of *ipseidad*" as a last resort in order to achieve redescription of oneself through the story. He links the analogical unit of the act to ontology of being and will⁵. This distinction suggests a fundamental dialectic between human activity of building itself and the experiences of passivity. Assuming the passivity of the body as Ricoeur explains enables us to understand human action as an intersection in the events of the world, and as a result of the agent election. The passivity is integrated into human activity in the sense that it is a necessary for the auto-construction. The dialectical synthesis between passivity and active constitution and teleological has a mediation experience of one's own body, the contact with the other person, and the relationship with one's own moral conscience. This passivity is understood as being

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a member of the world as well as a possibility to intervene, on its own initiative, in the course of events. The passivity is integrated in the human activity as a necessary means for the construction of oneself to the point where one's own moral conscience embraces a specific form of passivity as a symptom or sign of the metaphor of the voice of conscience, inner voice, while higher than oneself.

Therefore, Dr. Octavi, your biography reveals your continuing efforts to bring direction to your own life, although this has involved receiving reprisals which include problems with the police when you rebelled against the dictatorial system of Mr. Franco. My question is:

38. What happen with the events that put you in front of what is irresolvable? How do you face the human finitude? Have these situations-limits changed the course of your priorities?

As all, Sandra, I have gone through the years of my life solving adverse situations and imperative problems. Have I collided with the irresolvable? Of course. It has been noted that we inexorably live in a situation, which is certainly more than data consists in interpretation of each person. Xavier Zubiri in his book Naturaleza, Historia, Dios - Ed. National, 1944, pp. 404 - argues that "the situation is not something added to men and things, but the radical condition so that there can be things for the man." The same Da of the Dasein, or Da-sein, of Heidegger can be translated with the term of situation. The Da-sein, the Being-in-situation.

You are referring, Sandra, to limit-situations with the intention of qualifying what is irresolvable. I had met with them, totally apperceiving their total impact. I am convinced, after all, that not all of the entities go beyond the world. Is there another All? Even if there is, there is no way to hold it. The experiences of the situation-limit tell us about suffering and failure. One remains in radical loneliness when adventure in the understanding of all.

"I am always in a given situation," notes Karl Jaspers in his Philosophie. Philosophische Weltorientierung published in 1932. The seventh chapter of the second volume deals with the situations limits. I read this chapter for the first time in 1960 in a
Spanish version published in 1959 in San Juan, Puerto Rico and in Madrid. Even then I was struck with the subject.

A situation invariably involves limiting or leeway. The situations limits are opaque and we see nothing behind them. It is a question of a wall with which we confront and if front which we fail without fail. What are these situations? Always being in a situation, the struggle and suffering are appalling, we assume guilt; death can not be avoided. Being always in situation is part of our historicity; this is the situation limit original.

Death is the situation-limit that has impacted me the most, abandoning me in the ruin. The death of my mother, the of death my father, extinction, and absolute sinking all my little sister Maria. I was left alone without being able to follow her. It is no longer possible to ask her anything. The death of another, of course, is the only one that I was given to experiment.

My death? I can not see it although I suffer it. Upon my death I will entry in the not Absolute knowing where there will be no return. Immortality? Evidence of immortality, starting with those provided by Plato in the Phaidon e Peri psykhes are deficient, and I would even say that they are desperate. The only thing that can be tested is precisely mortality.

The limit situations, have they modified my priorities? I can affirm that no, Sandra. I certainly hurt, but I assume them because I can not stop being a human. The man is tragic animal in the opposite extreme of flea and the elephant, which coincide constantly with themselves. Human being, by contrast, is both the same and different; why? Because are aware of our existence. The conscience or apperception of ourselves is chilling challenge.

39. Dr. Octavi, although I know that your memories are a dense work that will take you some time, but knowing your unsatisfied nature, I guess, that you may already have plans for new journeys. Can tell me in advance something about these new concerns?
I have faced down at the end of my years with a single question: was it worth to come to the existence? Here you have the central theme of my possible ramblings once published the three volumes of Memories. I still do not know the treatment that I am going to give it; will it be a study, essay, or fiction? Only the time and the death know these things.

Dr. Octavi, thank you for the opportunity of getting back to this interview and answering my questions. I know that at present there are three Catalan universities working in an interesting website with your thoughts and I am sure that will be inspiring to follow up on this resource, which illuminates the understanding of your contributions. I would also like to thank you once again for mentoring me during the development of my research for obtaining my doctoral credits, and for your invaluable support during my work for my doctoral dissertation. Your accompaniment as a mentor and as a friend has been of a great value to me. You are a pedagogue who not only teaches what has to be taught, but you helped your pupils to discover the possibilities that go beyond the classroom and make an impact in our lives. Thank you for leaving the door open to the path of what is possible.